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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BREAKFAST: 
MARKET POWER AND INFORMATIVE SYMBOLS 
IN THE MARKETPLACE 
P. SEAN MORRIS* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article continues to examine an important question: are trademarks a source 
of market power, or, put differently, when are trademarks an antitrust problem? This 
fundamental question is a cause of division among antitrust and intellectual property 
law scholars. However, by raising the question and presenting some scenarios that can 
provide answers, my hope is that contemporary antitrust and intellectual property 
scholars can explore some of its implications. As part of my own quest to address this 
question, I explore the proposition that creative deception and the wealth-generating 
capacity of trademarks are unorthodox elements that actually contribute to allegations 
of monopolistic behavior through product differentiation. This article is organized in 
three major sections in addition to introductory and concluding observations. In Part 
Two, I discuss the concept of creative deception and argue that through trademarking 
activities creative deception helps to sustain market power. In Part Three, I offer a 
comparative analysis of market power in different intellectual property regimes such 
as patents, copyrights, and trademarks. However, I examine a few case studies where 
allegedly market power emerged as a result of creative deception and trademarking 
activities.  I examine, in particular, the Cereal complaints that the FTC addressed in 
the 1970s. Part Four of the Article offers a more systematic discussion on creative 
deception through three market dynamics: (a) trademarks as promoting competition, 
(b) trademarks as wealth generating tools, and (c) trademarks in product 
differentiation. These dynamics, I argue, bring us closer to view creative deception 
and trademarking activities as evidence that requires greater scrutiny under antitrust 
law. 
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whether trademarks are a source of market power, the approach, analysis, methods and 
arguments are different. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Are trademarks a source of market power?1 In order to properly answer such a 
question, a number of factors and angles must be incorporated into the discussion. 
This Article is one such line of argument from the perspective of economic theory on 
competitive markets, product differentiation, and a case law discussion which supports 
the notion that trademarks are a source of market power.  
Based on the above question, a number of related questions also arise. For 
example, how strong is the current monopoly theory of trademarks? What is the nature 
of the presumption of market power in trademarks and how does it affect antitrust 
laws? Market power, as is understood in antitrust law, is the ability to raise and sustain 
prices above the competitive market. Trademarks play a crucial role in acquiring 
market power by means of trademarking activities such as product differentiation or 
brand extension, and firms that enjoy significant market power can also effectively 
restrain competition.  
The debate on trademarks as monopolies saw its zenith from the late 1930s through 
the early 1950s (mostly in American legal scholarship) and then took a nosedive. 
Perhaps the strongest factor for its resurrection in recent years can be attributed to 
Glynn Lunney’s treatment of the topic in 1999 and subsequent sporadic discussion by 
other scholars.2 The courts have also struggled with the question of trademarks as 
monopolies for more than three centuries, indicating that such a question cannot be 
simply brushed under the rug; rather, the question must be looked at for its broader 
 
1 See generally P. Sean Morris, The Economics of Distinctiveness: The Road to 
Monopolization in Trade Mark Law, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (2011); P. Sean 
Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, 
35 J.L. & COM. 163 (2017); P. Sean Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Legal 
and Historical Encounters, 38 LIV. L. REV. 159 (2017). 
2 Glynn Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). But see William 
Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1987). 
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implication within antitrust law.  
In this Article, I will focus on the market power theory in intellectual property 
cases, such as patent and copyrights and the antitrust connection. The Article also 
investigates a complaint involving trademarks and the presumption of market power 
with the overall goal of capturing “a unified theoretical framework to estimate market 
power”3 when trademarking activities are employed in goods and services. The Article 
is part of a three-part series examining trademarks as sources of market power that I 
hope can ultimately revisit the debate or shine more light on the matter.4  
Primarily used as signals to identify the origin of goods where several competitors 
position themselves for the purchasing power of consumers, trademarks are the 
undisputed champions of such economic space. As a means of identifying product 
source, trademarks serve an important economic function in that they convey to 
consumers the origin of goods and other information associated with the goods, such 
as quality and reputation of the economic entity that produces the goods. One 
particular element of trademarks that evades commentators is their creative deception, 
which not only entices vulnerable consumers but also serves as one of the underlying 
elements in creating market power in trademarked goods. As I shall argue in the next 
section, creative deception is a form of trademarking activity that preys on the 
vulnerability of consumer psychology whereby a trademark signals both desirability 
(socially optimal) and monopolistic behavior (market retention) through product 
differentiation.  
II. CREATIVE DECEPTION AND THE NATURE OF TRADEMARKS IN COMPETITIVE 
MARKETS 
A. Trademarks as the Ultimate Intangible Property  
Trademarks have long been associated with economic enterprising. In both ancient 
and medieval times, man used symbols or stellar mythos to identify his livestock. 
Similarly, modern man as an economic entity (homo economicus) also informs his 
neighbor that his livestock are stamped with a certain sign, or, that sign as a symbol 
that the processed meat originated from his neighbor’s livestock.   
As modern trademarks developed from the late nineteenth century to present times 
due to the number of laws that were enacted, a trademark became to be seen as the 
ultimate intangible property and the very symbol of competitive markets that 
flourished from the turn of the twentieth century. But modern trademarks have since 
moved beyond using signs to more fanciful signs that are capable of graphic 
representation that includes a mixture of words, sounds, or smells to mark territorial 
borders in the market economy. 
For modern rightsholders, trademarks are powerful symbols that determine how 
effective a market function is, given that, trademarks serve as the gatekeeper to quality, 
status, originality, and consumer behaviors. Beyond one of their essential functions of 
identifying the source of goods, trademarks are also economic entities in their own 
right that serve the wealth creating process, in particular for the rightsholders of 
trademarks.  
In modern competitive markets, trademarks are constantly on a charm offensive to 
 
3 ROBERT STEINER, PRIVATE LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL COMPETITION 73 (Ariel Ezrachi & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2009). 
4 See supra note 1. 
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win the hearts and minds of the ‘average consumer,’5 while at the same time cementing 
their status as an infinite good due to their exclusivity. This dual complexion of 
trademarks suggests that trademarks are complex economic entities that offer a 
consumer enhancing effect on the one hand, and a form of barrier to entry on the other.  
Trademarks distinguish themselves from other forms of intellectual property rights 
due to their fluidity and omnipresence which is largely due to the infinite perpetuation 
of a trademark. This infinite perpetuation is derived from the exclusivity in the mark 
which becomes an inherent form of monopoly.  
B. Trademarks Infinity: “WONDER GREEN PILL” 
The infinite perpetuation theory can be demonstrated with the hypothetical wonder 
green pill, which, when taken by a male,6 gives him the momentum for endurance in 
certain physical activities. The wonder green pill, in this scenario, is covered by all the 
major intellectual property rights in broad terms: patent, trade secret, copyright to a 
lesser extent, and trademark. The patent of the wonder green pill will lapse after a 
certain number of years, normally within twenty, whilst the inventor (patentee) may 
never have to reveal his secret formula and the copyright will span his lifetime (plus 
almost another century).  
These forms of intellectual property rights in the wonder green pill are on a time 
continuum in the sense that they last a specific period of time. However, the trademark 
does not fall into this category because, upon renewal, it lasts the lifetime of the 
wonder green pill when placed on the market. Furthermore, it is the trademark of the 
wonder green pill—WONDER GREEN PILL—that creates: (a) the market for wonder 
green pills; (b) the reputation of the original manufacturer; (c) the goodwill; (d) the 
core asset of Wonder Green Pill, Inc.; (e) the investment leverage of Wonder Green 
Pill, Inc.; and (f) its wealth generating machine. This creates an infinite perpetuation 
of the trademark and how it operates in a competitive market amongst various knock 
offs of wonder green pills with similar “wonderness.” The effect here is that 
trademarks not only lead to social optimality, but also carve out a piece of history, in 
that, they often retain some form of infinite association to business and create an aura 
of stellar mythos.  
C. Trademarks Infinity: Beers, Carbonated Drinks, Hams and Market Dynamism    
If symbols of the stellar mythos were perhaps some of the world’s oldest signs,7 
 
5 For a discussion of the concept of the average consumer in the European context, see Jennifer 
Davis, Locating the Average Consumer: His Judicial Origins, Intellectual Influences and 
Current Role in European Trade Mark Law, 2005 (2) Intellectual Property Quarterly 183.  
6 To be fair to the opposite sex – when this article was originally written – there were no 
female “wonder green pill”, however, nowadays, the US FDA (and by virtue globally) has since 
2015 approved a female version of “wonder green pill”. See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Approves 
Addyi, a Libido Pill for Women, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2015 at B1.  
7 ALBERT CHURCHWARD, THE SIGNS AND SYMBOLS OF PRIMORDIAL MAN: THE EVOLUTION OF 
RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES FROM THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS 196 (2d ed. 1913) 
(observing that the ancient man developed several mythos, such as stellar, lunar and solar using 
symbols, and, as such, we (modern man) should “appreciate the knowledge of all our signs and 
symbols, etc..”); see also FRANK SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 
RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 17–19 (1925) (discussing guilds). 
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then, in a modern way, or at least since society has been organized around capitalist 
ideals at the turn of the twentieth century, then one of the oldest commercial 
trademarks still in existence is that of the red triangle of Bass Ale in the United 
Kingdom8 or that most ubiquitous COCA-COLA, a mark created by a supposedly 
broke pharmo-entrepreneur, John Pemberton, in the late 1880s for carbonated drinks.9  
Another contender for the oldest trademark in the Western world is 
WEIHENSTEPHANER.10 The mark was used by German monks in the middle ages 
for beers produced in their monastery and nowadays owned by the Bavarian State 
Brewery Weihenstephan.  
Certainly, there are other contenders both in the West and Far East, or Persia for 
that matter. Furthermore, other “old modern” commercial trademarks exist in various 
countries. These range from a Pine Tree Logo in Australia11 to an Eagle for condensed 
milk in Hong Kong12 to the Bass famous red triangle for beers in the U.K.13  
In the U.S., some of the oldest registered trademarks in continuous use include 
DEVILED HAMS,14 which went to the William Underwood Company of Boston in 
1868/1870,15 and is generally known as the “Red Devil” due to the ontological nature 
of the trademark. Other U.S. trademarks notable for their early registration and still in 
use include SAMSON for ropes, cords, or lines and QUAKER for oats.  
There is one noticeable feature about the contenders for the oldest trademark. Most 
have a connection with beer/ale and/or other forms of alchemist drinks, such as Coca-
Cola, or food related items.16 
But whichever trademark claims the coveted spot of being the oldest trademark 
still in commercial operation, there is no denying the fact that trademarks are 
commercial tools essential for market functions and help to distinguish one producer 
from another in a competitive market.  
Because of man’s basic needs, such as food, water, and other social necessities, 
 
8 Bass & Co. Ale entered UK’s trade mark registry on January 1, 1876, laying claim as the 
oldest registered trademark. See BASS & CO. ALE, UK Trademark No.UK00000000001. 
 
9 Bartow J. Elmore, Citizen Coke: An Environmental and Political History of the Coca-Cola 
Company, 14 ENTER. & SOC’Y 717–31 (2013). 
10 JOHN PARKES, HOME BREWING: SELF-SUFFICIENCY 12 (2009) (noting that Benedictine 
Abbey lay claim to be the oldest beer brewery in the world: “The oldest operating commercial 
brewery is the Weihenstephan Abbey in Bavaria, which obtained the brewing rights from the 
nearby town of Freising in 1040.”). 
11 Registered under the 1905 Commonwealth Trade Marks Act, Act No. 20 of 1905, which 
provided a uniform trademark law for Australia the first time. See Adriana Casati et al., Early 
Trademark Legislation Around the World–Part I, 57 INTA BULLETIN 17 (Sept. 15, 2002).  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
 
14 Teagan Schweitzer, Deviled Ham, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF FOOD AND DRINK IN 
AMERICA 621 (Andrew Smith ed., 2 ed. 2013).  
15 808 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 107 (Nov. 17, 1964). 
16 The third paper in this series that I have written uses branded beers as empirical evidence 
from the U.S. market to similarly argue that trademarks are a source of market power. See 
Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1, at 163. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
2019] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BREAKFAST                 41 
 
 
 
various creative individuals, such as John Pemberton and others, would turn raw 
material into processed items and create a ready market for such goods. However, 
where one lead is created, so is a follower or infringer. Thus, the market for process 
goods expands.  
In order for the original manufacturer to distinguish his goods from followers, his 
mark creates a balance in the market, yet it develops into a dual complexion. In this 
scenario, the duality of a trademark is to retain the market for the goods that the 
trademarks identify and also, a form of creative deception of consumers' psychology, 
where a trademark that indicates origin or quality is socially optimal.  
Markets react to the social optimality of consumer behavior given that, in the long 
term, the average consumer’s purchasing power increases and, as such, leads to 
increased output for goods bearing trademarks based on origin and quality. But an 
increased output in goods from a single source creates two scenarios–one negative and 
one positive. The first is that of price, where pricing remains constant or slowly leads 
upwards and, thus, has a negative effect on the consumer. The second scenario is 
market dynamism which creates a positive effect on the market on a whole, making it 
more competitive.  
The result of this positive effect leads to other spillovers, such as the entry of 
competitors with cheaper goods, but not necessarily higher quality, and an option for 
secondary consumers to benefit from the less pricey trademarked goods. Here, 
consumers are able to escape the creative deception often employed by the trademark 
owner in the original good for the less pricey goods. But the cost of this duality in 
trademark goods is that it creates a hierarchy of consumers—main consumers and 
secondary consumers. But further dynamism in the market where more than two 
players are able to compete for the hearts and minds of the consumer can create a loop-
hole for the average consumers, who are then able to choose from a number of goods 
whose trademarks indicate their source.  
D. Consumers and Creative Deception  
When a new trademark comes into existence, its creation is a signal about the 
commercial dynamism of the market, but nevertheless, the market’s competitive 
equilibrium is disrupted. The nature of this competitive equilibrium can be equated to 
what the Supreme Court referred to as “commercial magnetism”17 because, under most 
circumstances, the new entrant to the market was attracted by the reputation that the 
senior trademark built over time, and also, the new entrant is driven by the desire to 
create wealth for himself.  
The entry of new competitors into a dynamic market allows for the trademark 
owners to use their new trademarks not only to signal the origin of the goods, but it is 
also an opportunity for the new entrants to use the trademark to convey to the average 
consumer of an improved but affordable product. The goal of a new competitor is to 
successfully convince the average consumer of the attributes in his trademark. If this 
is achieved, then the dynamism of an even more competitive market suggests that a 
trademark’s role is moving beyond the source and origin functions to that which also 
include creative deception because of its ability to persuade the average consumer on 
 
17 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). See 
also Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 820 
(1927). 
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the nature of the product. But this does not mean that only those consumers who are 
labeled as average are susceptible to the creative deception of trademarks. In fact, all 
consumers including the main and secondary consumers are susceptible to the creative 
deception of trademarks in a competitive market. This is because consumers exercise 
a great deal of savviness and flexibility when shopping and the signals that are 
conveyed to them via trademarks are interpreted in such a manner that they are able 
to make their purchasing decisions based on those signals in a trademark.  
Creative deception is an artful form typically expressed in trademarks and other 
signs that preys on the psychological vulnerability of consumers in persuading them 
of the quality and benefits of merchandise. Creative deception does not relate to 
contemporary understanding of passing off, misleading, falsifying or other forms of 
deceptions generally found in trademark doctrines, such as the U.K.’s common law or 
continental Europe’s unfair competition laws.18 
Creative deception is a tool of trademarking activity employed in the competitive 
market of goods and services in the quest for market share and bottom line profit.19 
Although the quest for quality could also be a goal in creative deception, it is often not 
the underlying reason for creative deception, since the original goods that are 
represented by a trademark often retain a leading position over competitors or new 
product lines employ existing trademarks due to reputation and quality. An example 
would be Coca-Cola Classic and New Coke, where the latter used creative deception 
to drive profitability and competitors to the margins and, thus, retained its lead on the 
consumer market for specialized carbonated beverages.20 Creative deception in 
trademarking activities can also be linked to brand extension (a topic I discussed 
extensively elsewhere). 21  
The incentives for trademark owners to engage in creative deception are not hard 
to discern since creative deception drives profitability. But the exclusivity afforded by 
trademark laws allows for the practice of creative deception since a trademark or brand 
which is a result of creative deception is linked to the original trademark where the 
trademark owner enjoys exclusivity. A trademark owner cannot infringe his own 
trademark, however, a competitor, who engages in creative deception and tries to 
make a link to the competitor’s original mark, can infringe the competitor’s mark.  
 
18 Id. 
19 Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1218 
(2005). 
20 The Real Story of New Coke, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/coke-lore-new-coke.  
21 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1. Courts are sometimes known 
to treat trademarks similar to brands. See, e.g., O2 Holdings Ltd. v. Hutchison 3G Ltd. [2006] 
EWHC (Ch) 534 [4] (Eng.) (“Defining a brand is not easy. A lawyer would tend to think of 
goodwill, trade marks and so on.”); SIDNEY LEVY, BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS & RESEARCH 
143–44 (1999) (“[A] trademark is a brand or part of a brand that is given protection because it 
is capable of exclusive appropriation.”). See also Jennifer Davis, Between a Sign and a Brand: 
Mapping the Boundaries of a Registered Trade Mark in European Union Trade Mark Law, in 
TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 65 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 
2008); TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Teresa da Silva Lopes & Paul Duguid 
eds., Routledge 2010); P. Sean Morris, Guess What Gucci?: Post-Sale Confusion Exists in 
Europe, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2012); David Tan, Differentiating Between Brand and Trade 
Mark: City Chain v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 202 (2010). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
2019] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BREAKFAST                 43 
 
 
 
The broader implication of creative deception on consumers does not necessarily 
cause consumer confusion; rather, creative deception creates scenarios where 
consumers are loyal to original brands and any derivative of those brands by means of 
creative deception. Furthermore, the quality of goods that result from creative 
deception are perceived through the information that is conveyed via the creative 
deceptive mark, which is linked to the original mark and as such also about the brand 
the creative deceptive mark portrayed.  
There are, however, two broader implications of trademarking activities by 
creative deception. First is the creation of a larger market share for the rightsholder’s 
goods as a result of the original trademark. As such, the possibility of abusing that 
market share increases. The second is that of driving monopoly profits of the 
rightsholder and thus relegating trademarks to another function–that of wealth 
generation (see below). The nature of creative deception in trademarks is, in a sense, 
part of the discussion on the wealth generating function of trademarks but because 
creative deception in trademarks is an emerging theme, it should also form part of the 
wider debate on whether trademarks contribute to any form of innovation. 
E. Do Trademarks Contribute to Innovation?  
A trademark is not generally considered to be part of the innovative process, given 
that, unlike patents, there is nothing innovative about trademarks.22 But I beg to differ 
and posit that trademarks are indeed innovative (creative in a broad sense) and 
contribute to the innovation process. Trademarks’ contribution to the innovation 
process stems from that fact that trademarks are an intellectual component of the 
goods they bear and therefore improve the desirability and attributes of such goods 
that create more competition in the dynamic market which is driven by trademark’s 
creative deception and consumer purchasing power. If a market is competitive, then 
such competitiveness is an acknowledgment of the role trademarks play, since their 
innovative role helps to maximize the welfare of all consumers and leads to more 
efficiency in the market.23  
Even if we should cast aside the innovative or efficiency arguments when framing 
the nature of trademarks in a competitive market, other market mechanisms such as 
pricing and profitability or the retention of market share have allowed a surge in the 
expansion of trademarks in particular, through methods such as trademark extension 
via brands (themes not taken up in this Article), a noticeable trait in the beer/ale and 
carbonated drinks industry. As competition in the market increases, other practices 
also contribute to how a trademark is perceived by both the consuming public and the 
regulatory authorities. In the first instance, trademark laws were seen as a response to 
some of the direct practices and methods that plagued competitive markets. In other 
words, trademark laws were seen as curtailing market freedoms where trademarks sole 
function was to drive competition. And, in the other instance, those same laws were 
against the spirit of the free market.24  
Due to the world of competitive markets in which goods, ideas, innovation, and 
profitability are the driving forces, trademark laws were a response to those behaviors 
 
22 But see Dayoung Chung, Laws, Brands, and Innovation: How Trademark Law Helps to 
Create Fashion Innovation, 17 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 493 (2018) (discussing designs).  
23 Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademark Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J 1323 (1980). 
24 Schechter, supra note 17, at 813. 
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in order to prevent consumer confusion in such competitive markets. In other words, 
the competitive market, of which trademarks are the unique identifier of goods and 
services, had become hostile to the consumers whose hearts and minds they were/are 
chasing, since the creative deception of trademarks causes a state of confusion in those 
consumers. One likely broader implication of creative deception is the retaining and 
gaining of market power. 
III. MARKET POWER IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The essence of the market power inquiry in this Article is whether it can be 
acquired illegally by intellectual property rights that will offend the antitrust laws. I 
am not concerned about natural market power or those of a “historic accident”25 by 
nature or, as a result of, a grant in the intellectual property.  
If intellectual property rights are used to acquire market power illegally,26 does 
that market power violate antitrust law? This question is investigated in this section. 
In Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services,27 the Court acknowledged that market 
power arises as a result of “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict 
output.”28 The question of market power in intellectual property rights has been at the 
heart of antitrust and the intersection of intellectual property rights.29 This notion 
arises primarily because of the presumption that the exclusivity in intellectual property 
rights confers market power. This presumption was addressed in Illinois Tool Works, 
where that Court held that evidence was required to prove the existence of market 
power in patent tying arrangements and there was not the presumption of market 
power per se.30 This is good for other areas of intellectual property rights such as 
trademarks, since based on the Illinois Tool Works decision, there is no need to 
presume that the exclusivity in trademark protection should be used to confer market 
power.  
At the same time, if this argument is turned in the opposite direction by looking at 
evidence, then arguably, the factors that determine market power, and if such market 
power potentially violates antitrust law, should be based on hardcore evidence and 
data to realistically determine the acquisition of market power.31 But the Illinois Tool 
 
25 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (“The offence of monopoly under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”). 
26 Handbook of U.S. Antitrust Sources, 2012 ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L. 258–59 (“If a patent or 
other form of intellectual property does confer market power, that market power does not by 
itself offend the antitrust laws. …[M]arket power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, 
even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual 
property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such 
property.”). 
27 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
28 Id. at 464 (citing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).  
29 Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 
49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 839 (2007).  
30 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (Ill. 2006). 
31 See also Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.  
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Works decision was uniquely patent and also touched upon other areas of intellectual 
property rights, such as copyrights and trademarks, whereas, these latter two have a 
complex and unique approach to assessing market power.32 This is due to the number 
of factors to be taken into account, and how those factors are interpreted and analyzed 
in the other main body of law which is uniquely important—antitrust law.33  
Prior to Illinois Tool Works, the presumption that market power automatically 
exists where there is the conferment of copyrights and patents (trademarks are a 
different category) had been rejected in some lower courts in the United States.34 Some 
courts were quick to discard the presumption that market power exists in intellectual 
property rights. For example, in Root v. Computer Dynamics,35 the court rejected the 
notion of “absolute presumption of market power for copyrighted or patented 
products.”36 The judgment in Illinois Tool Works would do away with such a per se 
presumption and shift the dynamics in assessing market power in intellectual property 
rights. There is a silver lining in Illinois Tool Works for the market power analysis in 
trademarks. The decision supports the thesis that if evidence is gathered that shows 
that trademarks are tools for obtaining market power and that that market power has 
been used in an anticompetitive way, then trademarks serve as sources of market 
power and, furthermore, trademarks promotes product differentiation–it is the use of 
the market power in violation of the antitrust rules that makes trademarks, the bad guy, 
so to speak.  
Market power in intellectual property ought to be justified. Certainly if a drug 
company were to create a new wonder pill for erectile impulses and obtain intellectual 
property protection for various aspects of the pill—this does not mean that there is an 
automatic demand for the new pill, simply because the new pill is covered by patents, 
copyrights, or trademarks. If one of the potent secrets of the new wonder pill would 
be the ability to heighten a male’s impetus for encounters with another person,37 the 
creators would then be able to control all aspects of how the pill is distributed and 
sold. A market would be created, whereas, the manufacturers of the new wonder pill 
would be able to command a monopoly position on the market for heightened 
encounters. Thus earning super normal profits for the creators, however temporary 
that may be. 
Intellectual property protection creates market power for the product in question—
however, this does not mean that the mere existence of market power is a breach of 
antitrust law.38 What the existence of market power tells us is that there is a need to 
gather the evidence in order to demonstrate that such existence creates a willingness 
 
32 Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45. 
33 Id. at 31. 
34 A.I. Root Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc, 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 676. 
37 See also my disclaimer at supra note 6.  
38 Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[V]iolation of the 
antitrust laws always requires …market power in a defined relevant market (which may be 
broader than that defined by the patent) . . .”). 
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to abuse that power at the expense of the consuming public.39 
A. Copyrights and Market Power 
As with the many questions that this Article raises about market power, one 
pertinent area of intellectual property rights that plays a critical role is copyrights. Do 
copyrights confer market power? This section merely alludes to the issue and does not 
argue the many intrinsic details pertaining to this question.  
It is worth noting that copyright protection traverses complex areas of protection, 
whether it be an author’s work, databases, collecting societies, software programming 
among others, and discussing market power or even antitrust in the area of copyright 
would also require a dissection of those many areas before a true and accurate picture 
of market power in the copyright context can be confirmed. Nevertheless, on a few 
occasions, the courts have confirmed the existence of market power in copyrighted 
products, and hence, was liable under antitrust law. In Data General v. Digidyne,40 the 
Supreme Court noted that consumers were “locked in” to the product in question and 
“viewed the copyright . . . as creating a presumption of market power.”41 This passage 
alone from the court’s decision raises two possible antitrust harms. The first harm 
under antitrust analysis would be the “locked in” scenario, where consumers are 
locked in to a product or services. The second antitrust implication is that of actual 
market power. A finding of market power would determine how that power was used 
to violate the antitrust rules.  
In the competitive economy where ideas and the protections by copyrights and 
other intellectual property have become paramount, the pressing concern from an 
antitrust perspective is how copyright misuse affects the market. 42 For example, in 
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat, Inc.,43 the court explained that contractual 
restrictions could be used as instruments that may give rise to monopoly power beyond 
that is already protected under the copyright, and therefore, would be a violation of 
antitrust law.44  
Unlike trademarks, copyright protection shares certain kinds of traits with patents, 
 
39 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.  
40 473 U.S. 908 (1985).  
41 Id. at 909 (“[T]his case raises several substantial questions of antitrust law and policy, 
including . . . whether market power over ‘locked in’ customers must be analyzed at the outset 
of the original decision to purchase, and what effect should be given to the existence of a 
copyright or other legal monopoly in determining market power.”). 
42 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984); Lasercomb 
Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust 
Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1469, 1477 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that “[a]n alleged infringer can establish 
copyright misuse by showing either that (1) the defendant violated the antitrust laws, or (2) the 
defendant illegally extended its monopoly beyond the scope of the copyright or violated the 
public policies underlying the copyright laws.”). 
43 816 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing a no contest clause). 
44 For a discussion on some European developments in the early 2000s where contractual 
restrictions were also a concern in legislations see P. Sean Morris, Grant-Backs and No 
Challenge Clauses in Europe: What Lessons from the MedImmune v. Genentech Case, 31 
World Competition 113 (2008). 
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and thus copyright protection is presumed to include market power.45 The exclusivity 
in the patent or copyright, for the duration of the protected term, allows the right 
holders to become monopolists. But there is a rational reason for such exclusivity. 
Copyright, like patents, serves to promote innovation and creativity in the 
marketplace.46 This goal is also one that antitrust law pursues, by limiting actions that 
distort or monopolize the competitive process—so that creators, authors and inventors 
can reap some form of economic benefit.47 The challenge that the intellectual property 
system and the antitrust system face is how to reconcile those two forms of conflicting 
goals—for the better good of a more competitive economic space. 
B. Patents and Market Power 
Patents have always had a special place at the intersection of intellectual property 
law and antitrust law. The very notion of intellectual property could easily be 
substituted for patents, whenever such a discussion is raised. This is also evident by 
the voluminous case law and literature on the subject—the majority of which revolve 
around patents.48 But my purpose is to merely alert the reader’s awareness on the 
nature of patents and market power. Any substantial discussions require, at minimum, 
a monograph.  
In rulings such as Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court has erected a more 
cautious wall towards holding that the presumption of market power in patent tying 
arrangements are illegal per se, and argued that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that a defendant has market power by producing evidence to that 
assumption.49 Simply assuming that market power exists due to the grant of a patent 
was no longer enough. In fact, Illinois Tool Works has implications for other areas of 
intellectual property law, including trademarks. One such implication is the conduct 
of market power in franchising agreements, as per Siegel v. Chicken Delight.50 But 
aside from Illinois Tool Works, other classic cases, such as Jefferson Parish,51, 
Qualitex52 and Loew’s53 have all contributed to the legal approach of market power in 
patents. 
In the last few years, as a result of the peaceful coexistence of antitrust law and 
intellectual property law—patent law in particular—the question of market power in 
patents is no longer a dreaded situation. The decision in Illinois Tool Works reflects 
 
45 Aaron Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9–10 (1999); Hanna Ramsey, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for 
Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 413–14 (1994). 
46 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994). 
47 Id. at 526. 
48 See also Warren Lavey, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks as Sources of Market Power 
in Antitrust Cases, 27 Antitrust Bulletin 433 (1982). 
49 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006).  
50 448 F.2d 43, 49–50 (9th Cir. 1971).  
51 See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
52 See Qualitex Co. v Jacobson, 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
53 See United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
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this. Much debate remains on the extent of market power in intellectual property, such 
as trademarks, and I concur with the Court in Illinois Tool Works with the producing 
of evidence to demonstrate market power.54 This is even more relevant for trademarks 
(and in another paper where I use the U.S. beer industry as an example, the evidence 
is somewhat convincing).55   
A word of caution is warranted. The difficult task of developing and analyzing 
evidence in relation to market power does not mean that the desired outcome will be 
that market power will actually be demonstrated, however, what the task itself can 
demonstrate is that even with the evidence—this does not necessarily mean that 
market power exists. Thus, patents, which have the shortest protection period when 
compared to copyrights and trademarks, are essential to the innovation and 
competitiveness of an economy, and the attainment of market power by patented 
products could actually be a good thing for an economy.  
C. Trademarks and Market Power: Any Lessons from the Breakfast Cereal 
(Brands) Complaint? 
In 1972, the FTC filed a complaint against a number of breakfast cereal 
producers.56  The FTC complained that cereal manufactures were engaged in practices 
that maintained a highly concentrated non-competitive market structure for ready-to-
eat cereals. The companies named in the complaint were producers of ready-to-eat 
(RTE) breakfast cereals.57 Several other companies such as Nabisco and Purina were 
named but not as respondents. The FTC alleged that the five cereal manufacturers 
were violating Section 5 of the FTC Act.58 In the complaint, the FTC claimed that 
“competition has been hindered, lessened and eliminated” in the RTE market, 
resulting in a non-competitive market structure.59  
One particular allegation by the FTC against the RTE producers stood out: “brand 
proliferation, product differentiation, and trademark promotion.”60 This allegation is 
significant because it captured the essence and core of the theory on trademark as 
sources of market power. The FTC developed two theses for brand proliferation, 
production differentiation and trademark promotion: the first was barriers to entry and 
the second was advertising expenditures.61 The third aspect on trademark promotion 
was incorporated under the allegation of “unfair methods of competition in advertising 
 
54 See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 46. 
55 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.  
56 The Cereal Case: Opening Shot in FTC War on Structural Shared-Monopoly or Attack on 
Marketing Irregularities, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 71, 75 (1971) [hereinafter Cereal Case] 
(reprinting of FTC’s complaint against the cereal industry, including Kellogg Company, 
General Mills, Inc., General Food Corporation, and the Quaker Oats Company).  
57 Id. at 75–76 (defining RTE as: “food products made from barley, corn, oats, rice or wheat 
and various combinations of such grains which are flaked, granulated, puffed, shredded or 
processed in other ways. RTE cereals are eaten primarily as a breakfast food requiring little or 
no preparation by the consumer.”). 
58 Id. at 75. 
59 Id. at 79. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 80. 
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and product promotion.”62 It is the allegation on brand proliferation and production 
differentiation which I am mostly concerned with.63 The FTC complaint, after almost 
a decade of investigation, was dismissed in 1982.64 However, because the complaint 
was a Section 5 complaint, dealing with deception and unfairness and would not 
necessarily violate antitrust law, the complaint itself was tainted.65 However, the 
language and style of the complaint made clear that the FTC wanted to pursue an 
antirust claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but such a task would have been 
more tedious for the FTC. Part of the FTC’s complaint, which I construe to be strictly 
antitrust was the “practices of proliferating brands, differentiating similar products and 
promoting trademarks through intensive advertising resulting in high barriers to entry 
into the RTE cereal market.”66 The allegations made by the FTC into the cereal 
industry effectively uncovered the notion of brand proliferation and their antitrust 
effect, in particular when brands are synonymous with trademarks. 
The cereal brands complaint raised two interconnected issues that are significant. 
The first is the issue of market definition and the market for cereal. The second is the 
issue of brand proliferation. On the issue of market definition, or determining the 
market for ready-to-eat cereal, the complaint alleged that among themselves, four of 
the cereal manufacturers controlled 90 percent of the RTE market by 1970.67 One of 
the key tests in determining market definition and possible violations of antitrust law 
is the calculation of market shares.68 The 90 percent market share held by the four 
 
62 Id. at 82 (“These unfair methods of competition have contributed to and enhanced 
respondent’s ability to obtain and maintain monopoly prices and to exclude competitors from 
the manufacture and sale of RTE cereal.”).  
63 Id. at 82–85 (explaining the several other allegations such as: the control of shelf space by 
Kellogg; the acquisition of competitors and thereby engaging in monopoly power and 
maintaining artificially inflated prices). 
64 In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982). 
65 Id. at 265. 
66 Cereal Case, supra note 56, at 80. 
67 Id. at 79. 
68 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984). 
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manufacturers69 was credible evidence for a finding of market power.70  
The second issue of brand proliferation, which is linked to product differentiation, 
was predatory in nature. With more than a hundred brands among themselves, and 
coordinating for shelf space, the predatory brand proliferation were conduits for 
exclusion of new entrants in the RTE market. There are lessons to be learned from the 
breakfast cereal. The two most important lessons were largely ignored both by the 
courts and the legal academic literature.71 The first is predatory brand proliferations 
(again, this issue I take up in a separate paper on the U.S. beer industry)72 and the 
second lesson is that market power can be presumed with trademarks. The rest of this 
Article concentrates on the latter in a wider context.  
IV. TRADEMARKS, HOMO ECONOMICUS AND THE FIRM 
A. Trademarks and the Promotion of Competition  
One of my claims in the previous section is that trademarks contribute to the 
innovation process, and as controversial as this claim may be, let us assume that this 
claim is correct. Thus, if trademarks contribute to the innovation process, what in 
broad terms should the innovation process aspire to? I argue that one such aspiration 
of the innovation process, for which trademarks are a part of, is the promotion of 
competition in a competitive market economy. My reference to competition in this 
section is that of rivalry between firms or individuals on a market competing for 
consumers using goods or services represented by a trademark or a derivative brand 
from a trademark. This is crucial in order to develop my further arguments, and to stay 
 
69 The conventional wisdom is that even nowadays, the big four manufacturers of RTE still 
control the RTE market. See Jeffrey J. Reimer & John M. Connor, Market Conduct in the U.S. 
Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 1 J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1 (2002) (“Three characteristics 
distinguish the U.S. ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry. First, the industry is highly 
concentrated. Although there are approximately 40 companies producing more than 400 brands, 
more than 90% of output since 1980 has been produced by just five companies. Another 
characteristic is excessive advertising. Average selling expenses are 30% of sales value, with 
smaller firms tending to advertise more than large firms. Moreover, most of this expense is for 
mass-media advertising. The third distinguishing characteristic of the RTE cereal industry is 
product proliferation. New product launches have increased from one or two products per year 
in 1950, to more than 100 per year since 1989. If one accounts for all of the variations in sizes 
and flavors of the 400 brands, there are approximately 1000 RTE cereal products for sale in the 
U.S. Private label products, an important source of competition in other industries, have limited 
effect in the RTE cereal industry. Though they are priced about 40% above private label 
products, branded products continuously capture more than 90% of the market.” (citations 
omitted)). 
70 Aviv Nevo, Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 69 
ECONOMETRICA 307, 310 (2001). 
71 But see Barry L. Bayus & William P. Putsis, Jr., Product Proliferation: An Empirical 
Analysis of Product Line Determinants and Market Outcomes,18 MKTG. SCI. 137, 138 (1999); 
William P. Putsis, Jr., An Empirical Study of the Effect of Brand Proliferation on Private Label-
National Brand Pricing Behavior, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 355, 359 (1997); Ruth Raubitschek, A 
Model of Product Proliferation with Multiproduct Firms, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 269, 277 (1987); 
Leonard Fong-Sheng Wang & Ya-Chin Wang, Brand Proliferation and Inter-Brand 
Competition: The Strategic Role of Transfer Pricing, 35 J. ECON. STUD. 278, 279 (2008); Steffen 
Ziss, Divisionalization and Product Differentiation, 59 ECON. LETTERS 133, 136–37 (1998). 
72 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1. 
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clear of competition that has a linkage to antitrust as that discussion is reserved for 
later in this Article. Moreover, the argument that trademarks promote competition, 
although slightly raised in the previous sections, offers a more detailed and balanced 
view in this section.  
Competition in the marketplace for consumer purchasing power using trademarks 
(or a brand) promotes the overall interest of society. The competitive market is a place 
where goods and services are provided by various individuals and firms using their 
unique source of identification–the trademark to lure consumers at a continuous 
frequency to those goods and services.73 It is this competition among the varied 
players, whether they are firms or individuals, using their trademarks as source 
identifiers of goods and services that serve as one of the most important operative 
modules in the quest for innovation and the promotion of competition itself. Therefore, 
trademarks’ role in this grand game of market competition is fairly obvious. First, 
trademarks help consumers identify the source of the goods. Second, trademarks, 
when used to identify new and innovative goods on the market, generate more revenue 
and offer additional choices to consumers. Third, trademarks, when representing an 
existing good, also signals the goodwill investment in that good and thereby can lead 
to overall profit for the trademark owners who also maintain or increase their market 
share. 
As has been seen so far in this Article, the question is whether an increase in market 
share can lead to illegal market power and, relatedly, what is the actual role of the 
trademark itself in creating illegal market power. In Europe, there are also some 
interesting dynamics where trademarks connote antitrust issues.74 At the federal 
European Union Intellectual Property Office—EUIPO—at the end of June 2014, there 
were four registered European Union trademarks (EUTM) for the anti-obesity 
(slimming pill), Grenade,75 under class five (dietary supplements etc.,) of the Nice 
trademark classification system.76 All four word marks– GRENADE; GRENADE 
DEFEND; GRENADE RPG and THERMO GRENADE—were owned by a single 
U.K. applicant (proprietor) for food and dietary supplements.77 These four trademarks 
are one of the means which the proprietor of these pink pills has in his arsenal in order 
to effectively compete in what is a competitive market for dietary supplements. The 
proprietor is able to use those trademarks with a blast (no pun intended) to announce 
new products on the market for dietary supplements and also at the same time to cater 
to the different purchasing power of consumers. In addition, the four trademarks for 
 
73 Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 
(1988). 
74 See Grenade UK Ltd v. Grenade Energy Ltd [2016] EWHC 877 (IPEC) (this case eventually 
held as passing off under UK law). 
75 EUTM, 005182019; EUTM, 009206574; EUTM, 011827904; EUTM, 012086955, all 
owned by Grenade (UK) Ltd. EUR. UNION INTELL. PROP OFF., https://euipo.europa.eu/ 
eSearch/#details/owners/580204 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
76  Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the 
Purposes of the Registration of Marks June 15, 1957 (as revised). Class 5 covers goods and 
services to include: healthcare, dietary, herbal and nutritional supplements; preparations and 
substances; dietary food supplements; dietary supplemental drinks and shakes. 
77 Id. 
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dietary supplements also signal that some form of innovation occurred, and the 
trademarks are used to differentiate such innovation. And, similar to the magic created 
by the utopian wonder green pills mentioned in the previous section, the grenade pink 
pills often work magic for individuals seeking a slimmer waistline. For consumers, 
then, there is an obvious benefit. But do these pink pills, represented by different 
trademarks, actually promote competition?  
To justify how competition is promoted by trademarks, when the overall function 
of trademark law is to promote competition by protecting the reputation of the firm, 
in particular when a firm uses more than one trademark for essentially the same type 
of goods, it is possible to argue that, to a large extent, trademarks represent dynamic 
efficiency. In other words, in a dynamic market, trademarks serve as incentives for the 
efficient production of goods by a single proprietor, which in turn also signals to 
competitors to enter the market. This incentive for competitors to enter the market 
would be a direct result of trademarking activities where four or more trademarks are 
used by a single owner for the same type of goods. Arguably, under this scenario, 
trademarks promote effective competition and create more dynamism in the market. 
But the net result of this market dynamism is often overlooked or when it is addressed 
the standard analysis is that the various trademarks, or branding of goods for that 
matter, allows consumer to better identify the origin of goods and as such their welfare 
is better served. I do not disagree with this analysis. However, as I will suggest below, 
there is a new paradigm to trademarking activities and that is the wealth generating 
paradigm.  
But let us return for a moment to the example of the pink pill above as denoted by 
the GRENADE trademarks. In this context, the four trademarks serve to inform the 
consumer who is constantly searching for anti-obesity and dietary supplements. But 
the market is competitive and there are other such supplements widely available. 
However, an anti-obesity supplement as indicated by the GRENADE trademark will 
give the consumer a blast so to speak, due to their qualities and or as being a first—a 
market leader. Taken in this context and by implied reference to competitors in the 
dietary supplements market, consumers can view trademarks’ chief role as the tool for 
the promotion of competition since they are able to decipher all the necessary 
information embedded in the various trademarks that represent dietary supplements. 
The upshot for consumers then is their ability to choose which such dietary supplement 
they prefer (for a slimmer waistline), and as such, trademarks in a general sense are in 
the best interest of the consuming public due to their ability to promote competition. 
And, as I argue below, in the context of product differentiation, trademark laws 
responded to the promotion of competition in order to ensure that fair competition 
actually exists on the market but should now navigate through the trajectories of other 
laws such as antitrust law. 
Even where consumers are the driving force behind trademarks promoting 
competition, it does not necessarily mean that consumers themselves recognize this 
phenomenon. The reason for this is not surprising because consumers often times lack 
the necessary expertise in markets where they purchase goods.  
Take for example, the market for slimming pills, such as those represented by the 
GRENADE trademark. Most of the consumers would be those seeking to lose weight 
and therefore can easily succumb to a product that advertises itself as the best in the 
weight loss market. This vulnerability on the part of the consumer suggests that they 
are uninformed and lack expert information on the weight loss market. Therefore, 
certain branded products dictate their shopping behavior. The brand, as represented by 
the trademark, although providing consumers with valuable information, steers the 
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consumer in a habit of refusing to seek out other weight loss products or even to 
compare weight loss products represented by the same trademark even under different 
brands. One could also argue that consumers who buy only one type of weight loss 
products as represented by a single trademark owner believe that switching to a 
different brand, even where prices are lower, is not worth the time or effort. This 
results in some consumers being uninformed of the relative economics of scale that 
are available on the market for weight loss products which trademarks promote in the 
broader dynamism of a competitive market. Thus, the consumer market behavior is 
also crucial to trademark as a means of promoting competition because that very same 
market behavior is responsible for the informed and the uninformed consumer, crucial 
for trademark’s information role in competitive markets.  
The crucial difference between an informed consumer and an uninformed 
consumer is that the uninformed consumer remains loyal to a certain product and does 
not take the time to switch or make comparisons of the variety of products available 
on the market. The informed consumer on the other hand, performs these tasks 
expertly, and in doing so, is able to drive competition because other trademarks 
(branded goods) passed on crucial information so that he can reach out to the goods 
or services offered by rivals, for example on the market for weight loss supplements, 
and as such, trademarks further help to promote competition. The informed consumer 
who is equipped with a wealth of information can adjust to changes in price or abandon 
his usual consumption pattern in favor of other brands of the same product (weight 
loss supplements) and fosters a competitive spirit that ultimately creates further 
goodwill in the multiplicity of trademarks. The irony is that, on the one hand, 
trademarks, while providing consumers with valuable information and driving 
competition, do not convince the uninformed consumer. That consumer will remain 
loyal only to certain brands. On the other, the informed consumer who embraces the 
diversity of goods trademarks represents and helps to fuel growth of the market 
economy. Thus, even though based on this reasoning that a market expands as a result 
of trademarks there is an inherent paradox: how to change the purchasing habits of the 
un-informed consumers when compare to the informed consumers.  
By the time most modern trademark laws were introduced from the late 1880s, 
mostly in Europe and the U.S., courts had already begun conceding that trademarks 
help to promote competition and efficiency in a market and infringing trademarks can 
reduce that competition and efficiency if they lead to, for example, loss in sales. In 
Sykes v. Sykes,78 for instance, where the defendant allegedly marked his goods with 
the same mark as that of the plaintiff’s superior mark for powder flasks and shot-belts, 
an English court noted that the plaintiff enjoyed great reputation with the public and 
the defendants infringing goods lead to a loss in sales for the plaintiff.79 Although the 
case was that of passing off under English Common law, it recognized the protection 
of trademarks and, as such, its significance was that it alerted regulators, the courts, 
and the subsequent development of trademark laws, the economic impact infringement 
can cause to the competitive process–and in this situation a negative one. In other 
 
78 Sykes v. Sykes (1824) 3 B. & C. 541, 542, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B.). 
 
79 Id. 
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decisions, such as Blanchard v Hill,80 the English courts were also confronted with the 
many paradoxes of trademarks, such as promoting competition, but also creating 
monopolies.81 But once trademark laws were introduced from the late 1880s, and 
onwards to the first half of the twentieth century, the courts were sympathetic to the 
notion that trademarks promote competition or create monopolies.82  
Recent courts decisions have also picked up on the notion that trademarks promote 
competition, even if such trademarks are embedded as “keywords” to meet the 
demands of twenty-first century advertising on electronic mediums such as the 
internet. For instance, in Google France v. Louis Vuitton, the Court of Justice of 
European Union (CJEU) observed in particular that “[trademark] keyword advertising 
promotes competition” even in the absence of an economic link between two rivals on 
the market for flowers.83 The Court was referring to the selection in “Adwords” of 
keywords which correspond to trademarks, and the statement by the Court can be 
interpreted as a formal admission of how crucial trademarks are to the functioning of 
an integrated economy comprised of different cultural traditions under a single rubric 
of market integration.84  
In other markets where there is a continuous homogenous band of consumers, such 
as in the U.S., courts too have linked trademarks to that of promoting competition. In 
Park N’ Fly, the U.S. Supreme Court was rather succinct on how trademarks fosters 
competition: “trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of 
product quality.”85 The fostering of competition by trademarks, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained was due to the fact trademarks are able to secure for “the producer 
the benefits of good reputation.”86 The Court might have been conservative in their 
references to trademarks as economic entities that foster competition and that might 
have been because going beyond those conservative statements would intertwine 
trademark law and protection with other areas of the law which would be more 
problematic.  
Putting the above arguments in perspective, one can find two particular aspects of 
why trademarks’ role in promoting competition is rather appealing. The first is that of 
what courts like Park N’ Fly referred to as (a) good reputation and (b) trademarks as 
autonomous economic entities.87 The reputation paradigm stands at the very heart of 
 
80 Blanchard v. Hill (1742) 2 Atk. 484 (Ch.), 26 Eng. Rep. 692, overruled by Cabrier v. 
Anderson (1777) 2 Atk. 487.  
81 Id. 
82 Sara V. Dobb, Compulsory Trademark Licensure as a Remedy for Monopolization, 26 
CATH. U. L. REV. 588, 592–93 (1977). See also Historical Encounters, supra note 1. 
83 Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch) (Eng.) (citing joined 
cases 236/08, 237/08 & 238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417, which 
states that “a trade mark is selected as a keyword by a competitor of the proprietor of the mark 
with the aim of offering internet users an alternative to the goods or services of that proprietor.”). 
84 Id.  
85 Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). 
86 Id. at 198; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992). 
87 Park 'n Fly, 469 U.S. at 198; Jorge V. Ramos, The Economics of Trademarks (Aug. 31, 
2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida International University) (available at 
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2231). 
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trademark protection because it is the goodwill in the reputation of a trademark that 
allows a proprietor to reap other incentives. Then, there is the argument that 
trademarks are autonomous economic entities. This is so because of their reputation 
paradigm that drives the profit of the proprietors or form the most important asset in a 
firm, and, as such, trademarks can be sold, licensed or leased as a value making 
property.  
These two initial observations are important as they capture some of the sentiments 
courts expressed in some trademark cases. Also, because both the reputation paradigm 
and the autonomous entity paradigm are creators of goodwill and they indicate, in 
particular, the autonomous entity paradigm that market forces associated with 
trademarks are often neglected in an analytical way. But it is also these two particular 
reasons why trademark law itself promotes competition because the reputation in a 
trademark creates an avenue for access to the trademark, as Google France reminded 
us in examples such as Adwords, or other forms of trademarks that enhances a healthy 
form of competition with new entrants on the market.88 Apart from the promotion of 
competition, the real purpose of trademarks, I posit, is to generate wealth for its 
holders: the business of business is the actual business of trademarks.  
B. The Economics of Trademarks and Their Wealth Generating Capacity  
The ubiquitous nature of trademarks is a constant reminder of how signs and 
symbols are agents that help to shape the social, religious and economic behavior of 
human beings. Trademarks spread the gospel of goods and services, indicating their 
origins and the economic wealth of the owners. Trademarks shape the behavioral 
pattern of how consumers shop for goods as a trademark can indicate inferiority, 
luxury, quality, or social status. As the religious symbol of global commerce, 
trademarks are a source of freeriding and comparative advertising. The contemporary 
instruments that regulate the protection of trademarks in national jurisdictions, such 
as the Lanham Act in the U.S. or the Trademark Directive (TMD) in Europe, readily 
invoke the exclusivity of trademarks.89  
The exclusivity of trademarks is reinforced by the courts as any infringement 
barring permission from the trademark owner is a detriment to the economic livelihood 
of the trademark owner, creating mistrust in the marketplace for goods and services 
among consumers. Trademark law, in its current fashion, is an instrument that serves 
the market economy by promoting competition—largely by ensuring that the 
reputation or goodwill in a trademark is protected90—while seemingly providing 
avenues for the benefit of consumers for which trademarks, according to the current 
predominant theory, reduce consumer search costs.91 Trademark law for its part has 
been generally viewed as suffering perhaps from intellectual dys-functionalism given 
that it is not as rich in “theoretical or practical connection” to other areas of intellectual 
 
88 Google France, 2010 ECR I-02417, PP 596. 
89 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002); Directive (EU) 2015/2436, art. 5, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 26. 
90 Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark 
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 601 (2006). 
91 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (adopting the search cost function 
of trademarks); Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at  275. 
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property law, such as patent law or copyright law.92  
Nevertheless, one intellectual discourse that trademarks have undergone in recent 
years is the economics, or law and economics, approach to trademark law. Under this 
approach, scholars use economic analysis to explain the purpose or function of 
trademarks and the effect of economic analysis on trademark law.93 The impact of 
these views has been the main stay on the intellectual discourse of trademarks with 
little challenges or alternate propositions/approaches. With the exception of David 
Barnes’s 2006 article,94 which largely rejected the private goods nature of trademarks 
and classified trademarks as a form of public goods, and hence, suggested market 
failures are “associated with the supply of trademarks and the information they provide 
about products and sources of products,”95 there has been little dissent in the trademark 
law literature on the economics of trademarks or positing a different economic 
interpretation of trademarks. There have been notable exceptions, for example 
Lunney96 who argued that trademarks still retain their inherent monopolies which 
distort the competitive market and Griffiths97 who offered marketing dimension on 
trademarks using economic analysis. My own attempt to pursue a new line of thinking 
in the literature on the economics of trademarks looked at the case law mostly in 
Europe,98 and argued that product differentiation is one aspect that could steer the 
economics of trademarks in a new direction.99 I will further develop some of the 
arguments on product differentiation in the final part of this Article.  
If ever there was a moment to rescue or expand those arguments,100 the opportunity 
is presented here in this section. I will advance this claim by proposing that the 
economics of trademarks should be analyzed from their wealth generating function. 
The creation of wealth is essential to the free market, both for individual human beings 
and for firms that invest in trademarks used to bring goods and services to the market. 
I do not reject the search costs function of trademarks as posited by Landes and 
Posner,101 but my contention is that the main function of trademark cannot be watered 
down to search costs. Rather, the main function of trademarks should be seen for what 
they are, the generating of wealth for their owners, so that wealth can be used to either 
 
92 David Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22, 22 
(2006) (advocating a public goods dimension of trademarks and rejecting the private goods label 
attached to trademarks). 
93 Economics of Distinctiveness, supra note 1, at 324, 340 (summarizing most of those 
discussions); Economides, supra note 64, at 525; Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 265. 
94 See Barnes, supra note 94. 
95 Id. at 24. 
96 Lunney Jr., supra note 2, at 373. 
97 ANDREW GRIFFITHS, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON TRADE MARK LAW (2011). 
98 See Economics of Distinctiveness, supra note 1; P. Sean Morris, Trademarks and the 
Economic Dimensions of Trademark Law in Europe and Beyond, Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics (2016) https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-
7883-6_566-1. 
99 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1. 
100 See Economics of Distinctiveness, supra note 1. 
101 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 270. 
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reinvest in more quality goods and services for the consumer or to generate more 
upstream wealth when the ownership in the trademark is passed on. By focusing on 
the wealth generating function of trademarks, I am able to not only diverge from the 
search cost theory but posit that this new theory of wealth generating also reinforces 
the exclusive monopolies in trademarks.  
As a form of creative expression embodied in a sign that represents goods and 
services, which in the form of a word, a combination of words, shapes, sounds, colors, 
numbers, or other forms, a trademark represents wealth or aspirations for wealth. The 
current theories of the uses of trademarks predominantly place the consumer at the 
beneficial forefront by asserting that trademarks reduce consumer search costs.102 This 
view was first developed simultaneously by Landes and Posner, where the authors 
asserted that trademarks reduce consumer search costs and therefore promote 
efficiency in the market.103 Landes and Posner developed a model in which they 
explained that the essential function of trademarks is to reduce consumer search costs 
and explained in particular that “the benefits of trademarks in reducing consumer 
search costs require that the producer of a trademarked good maintain consistent 
quality over time and across consumers. Hence trademark protection encourages 
expenditures on quality.”104 Their arguments have been attractive and trademarks 
since have been relegated to that of easing shoppers’ frustration on the market. One 
poignant part in the quote above is the clause which also has serious implications on 
the uses of trademarks: trademark protection encourages expenditures on quality. 
This little unnoticed part of their diagnosis of trademark use has generally been 
ignored and, in my view, contains an exposition on the use of trademarks that suggest 
trademarks have an investment function. Perhaps it was this investment function that 
courts, such as L’Oreal v. Bellure, had in mind when they noted that an (additional) 
function of a trademark is that of investment.105  
The search cost function, which also made its way to the courts in judgments such 
as Ty v. Perryman and Qualitex v. Jacobson,106 was not only attractive because of its 
simplicity but because trademarks in themselves were also conceived as an economic 
entity–goods themselves. Thus, people shop for goods the trademark represents and 
they also shop for the trademark because the consumers have developed over a period 
of time a certain consistency in shopping for the goods and the associated experience 
in doing so arguably reduces their search methods. But the unique appeal of the search 
cost theory that Landes and Posner developed was because of applying economic 
analysis the focus shifted to the consumer.107 By doing this, the entire economic space 
in which trademarks exist reinforces the nature of a market where only consumers 
matter in the market and any actions sellers take, include in the form of a trademark, 
 
102 Barnes, supra note 94, at 27. 
103 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 265–66. 
104 Id. at 269. 
105 See the origins of the investment function of trademarks in L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 
[2010] EWCA Civ 535 (Eng.). 
106 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. 
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
107 Barnes, supra note 94, at 32. 
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is to the benefit of the consumer.108 The seller was communicating to the consumer 
the benefits and quality of his goods, the consumer need not look further when he 
recognizes the seller’s mark, and the seller’s mark was in the best interest of the 
consumer for economic efficiency.  
In the context of the search cost theory, a consumer who prefers WONDER 
GREEN PILL as the stimulant of choice to engage in physical activities, will after the 
first time, be able to know exactly what he or she prefers. Therefore, upon the second 
and subsequent times when shopping for stimulants, the trademark saves time, money, 
energy, and other efficiency criteria when choosing stimulants that carry the 
WONDER GREEN PILL trademark. In this context, the WONDER GREEN PILL 
trademark acts not only as the conveyor of information about the source or quality of 
the stimulant but it also enables the consumer to reduce his search costs. Under this 
scenario, the search cost theory, and by and large trademark laws, created instances 
where it is cheaper for the consumer to source his goods that contain certain qualities 
and thereby driv competition in the market, in particular the market for stimulants, 
where the WONDER GREEN PILL trademarked good is just one of the many. But 
therein lies an irony: a consumer, who only relies on the WONDER GREEN PILL 
without resorting to an alternative on the market, helps to create a situation in which 
trademark laws act as a culprit to “entrench market dominance by leading firms and 
make it harder for competitors to crack new markets.”109 The search costs theory, as 
provocative as it may be, also helps to perpetuate a crisis in trademark law, where 
trademark laws must act as a balance to provide consumer protection but at the same 
time ensure that trademark proprietors are shielded from undesirable elements in the 
competitive market that free-ride on their marks in the quest for consumers. 
Trademark laws’ crisis is inevitably the conduit that generates market power and 
serves potentially for the abuse of dominant position by also ensuring that wealth 
generating techniques are employed by trademark owners.  
One of the main reasons why the search cost theory in modern trademark law is 
predominantly the main theory that occupies both the time of scholars, and often the 
courts, is because it has an intellectual foundation from a law and economics approach. 
The appealing nature of modern law and economics approach to the law that was fully 
developed in the 1960s and mushroomed ever since (and even with Posner by the early 
1970s) had presented opportunities for other scholars to raise the search costs theory 
using a non-trademark law approach, in particular advertising. This is quite interesting 
because advertising, by and large, involves the use of a trademark and therefore in this 
connection, the difference between advertising and trademark is superfluous. If, 
arguendo, there is no difference between advertising—a conduit of information using 
a trademark—and a trademark in the literal sense of the word—the search cost theory 
based on advertising that was developed in some of the earlier literature is also crucial 
to how we understand the modern conception of the trademark search cost theory as 
posited by Landes and Posner.  
There are three crucial pieces of scholarship, at least in my view, from an 
advertising and information perspective, that are essential to understanding the search 
cost theory in modern trademark law. The first was a 1948 piece by Ralph Brown on 
 
108 Id. at 27. 
109 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in 
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 65–94 (Graeme B. Dinwoodle & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008). 
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Advertising and the Public Interests;110 the second was a 1961 piece by George Stigler 
on the Economics of Information;111 and the third was Philip Nelson’s Information 
and Consumer Search Behavior in 1970.112 Certainly, based on the vast amount of 
advertising literature from an economic perspective, others can add more food for 
thought; however, I singled out these three pieces because of a similar connection that 
Landes and Posner developed in their seminal 1987 article.113  
In 1948, Brown argued that the public primarily has an interest in a competitive 
market through which advertising is the cornerstone, providing that such advertising 
contains information about the goods so that consumers can choose.114 Brown framed 
what are arguable trademarks in the context of advertising as informative symbols, 
which encompasses “the legitimate informational value of labels pointing to an 
established reputation.”115 Brown viewed advertising in essentially the same way 
modern trademark functions are viewed, in that, Brown insisted, “advertising has two 
main functions, to inform and to persuade.”116  But the point to take away from 
Brown’s discussion was the suggestion that advertising in one form may promote 
“cost reductions”117 and this is important to the reduction search cost theory later 
developed by Landes and Posner.118 Even where Brown may have used the term 
“promoting cost reductions” in passing in reference to the possibility of advertising–
it was a poignant point because Brown’s overall discussion was that advertising serves 
the public interest and any protection of trade symbols should consider the degree to 
which that public interest is served by advertising, which essentially encompasses 
trademarks.119  
Where Brown used a law and economics discussion of advertising as a form of 
promoting cost reductions by serving the public interest, it was Stigler in 1961 and 
Economics of Information that fully developed the consumer search cost theory from 
an economic perspective.120 Brown had insisted that the “principal reason for 
 
110 See Ralph Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 
57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Jessica Litman, Breakfast With Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (1999). 
111 See George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
112 See Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970). 
113 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2. 
114 Brown, supra note 110, at 1180. 
115 Id. at 1187. 
116 Id. at 1183 (“With qualifications that need not be repeated, persuasive advertising is, for 
the community as a whole, just a luxurious exercise in talking ourselves into spending our 
incomes. For the individual firm, however, it is a potent device to distinguish a product from its 
competitors, and to create a partial immunity from the chills and fevers of competition. The 
result of successful differentiation is higher prices than would otherwise prevail.”). 
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120 Stigler, supra note 111. 
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advertising is an economic one”121 and by default is the primary reason for trademarks, 
which are encompassed in advertising.122 But crucially, Brown argued that one of the 
main functions of advertising was an informative one. Stigler, for his part on the 
informative role of advertising, argued that advertising was an efficient conduit for 
transmitting information to the consumer, which would have otherwise been costly to 
search for.123 In Stigler’s version of the search cost theory, information is a scarce 
resource and can incur additional costs to consumers and as such, greater search costs 
can result in price dispersion. Firms, Stigler argued then, use advertising to provide 
consumers with information and the result of that is advertising curtails the dispersion 
of prices: “price advertising has a decisive influence on the dispersion of prices. Search 
now becomes extremely economical.”124 This is a direct correlation to the reduction 
of search costs since advertising (functioning as trademarks) provides consumers with 
information, which overall leads to price dispersion and generally lowers search costs. 
In the context of the search cost theory, which is perhaps the most dominant theory on 
the functions of trademark, then it can be argued that it was Stigler who first introduced 
the search costs theory with advertising when read to also encompass trademarks and 
not necessarily Landes and Posner.125 By using advertising as a model of optimal 
economic search, Stigler was able to demonstrate that when applied to the market for 
goods and services, trademarks inherently reduce consumer search costs even if 
embedded in advertising.126 A similar line of argument to Stigler was also developed 
by Ozga’s Imperfect Markets127 prior to Stigler’s paper, where he insisted that there 
was always an informative element in all advertising.  
The next relevant discussion to the search cost theory was Nelson’s 1970 
contribution and later developed in Advertising as Information in 1974 in which he 
also insisted that advertising equips consumers with information allowing them to 
reduce payoffs.128 Building on the informative view of advertising, including the 
search theory developed by Stigler (1961), Nelson posited that products with overall 
quality are communicated through advertising and, where consumers behaved 
rationally, they are not prone to false advertising.129 Nelson further developed the 
notion of “search” and “experience” goods and argued that search goods were easily 
verifiable by the consumer and experience goods were those whose quality can only 
be determined once purchased.130 Nelson developed his advertising theory around this 
distinction of goods and noted that advertising in experience goods is uninformative 
 
121 Brown, supra note 110, at 1167. 
122 Id. at 1185 (describing trade symbols as “species of advertising” due to their “brevity and 
continuity in use, both of which are essential to their symbolic function.”). 
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whilst advertising in search goods is informative.131 Under these scenarios, Nelson 
suggested that experience goods allow consumers to detect high-quality brands 
through advertising and can rely on repeat purchases.132 What ties most of this 
literature on advertising to the search cost theory in trademark theory is the 
interconnection of advertising and brands and how they encompass trademarks. Given 
this connection of advertising to trademarks, the trademark theory of reducing 
consumer search costs is not entirely novel, and to some extent, has reached its 
capacity. In this regard, my proposition that the wealth generating function of 
trademark is to reestablish the original function of trademarks—the business of wealth 
creation.  
In my view there are other allied objectives of trademarks in addition to the 
consumer search costs theory developed by Landes and Posner. The most notable of 
such allied objectives are indication of source and goodwill investment which help to 
create greater efficiency for consumers and trademark owners alike.  There is another 
objective of the trademark system which registered symbols represents and this 
objective of trademarks has to be analyzed from the point of view where trademarks 
are seen as representing the economic interests of goods manufacturers and service 
providers. In this regard, an underlying goal of a trademark is to create wealth for 
goods manufacturers and service providers. This wealth generating function of a 
trademark eclipses the other projected goals such as the reduction of consumer search 
costs.  
In more recent times, one of the attractive theories of trademarks, from an 
economic perspective that has gained much attention, is that posited by David 
Barnes.133 Barnes argues that trademarks should be treated as public goods given that 
trademarks convey information that eventually becomes public consumption.134 
According to Barnes, trademarks are a “species of public good, in particular, mixed 
public goods”135 and the ultimate goal of trademark law, when juxtaposed with public 
goods theory, “is to provide the optimal amount of information about products and 
their sources.”136 Barnes noted that it was too simplistic to consider alone trademarks 
as private goods. He posited that, when viewed from a public good perspective, there 
are market failures associated with trademarks,137 typically to those associated with 
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132 Sridhar Moorthy & Scott A. Hawkins, Advertising Repetition and Quality Perception, 58 
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133 Barnes, supra note 94. 
134 Id. at 23. 
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numbers of homogenous users and the co-existence of both rivalrous and non-rivalrous 
heterogeneous users. Id. at 44. Impure public goods, Barnes argues “come in an infinite variety 
along the dimensions of publicness. A good may be a mixed public good, one type of ‘impurity,’ 
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with respect to other uses.” Id. at 45. 
136 Id. at 50. 
137 Barnes fully developed the market failure thesis from a trademark perspective, where he 
essentially points the fingers at competitors who can “quickly distort the mark’s source-
indicating meaning” as opposed to referential users, but conceded that “referential users may be 
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other areas such as patents or copyrights. In this regard, Barnes observed that: “Public 
goods theory demonstrates that the market failure justifying government intervention 
in the regulation of trademarks is the same as the justification for regulating copyrights 
and patents.”138 Now we have to ask ourselves, are trademarks a form of public good 
based on these theoretical propositions and if so, what are the implications?  
The underlining premise, as Barnes argues, for trademarks being a public good, is 
because of the information that a trademark conveys becomes “public” and freely 
available for all to use, in the sense of those words, once a trademark is in use.139 
Barnes argues that trademarks are non-rivalrous in nature and made a linkage to the 
Samuelson theorem of public goods, which states that once a good is introduced on 
the market, “any given unit of the good can be made equally available to all”140 and 
that trademarks under these circumstances are used referentially. Barnes posits: “Once 
a supplier adopts a mark to use proprietarily and uses it in commerce, that mark is 
equally available to all to use referentially.”141 Thus, non-rivalry in (trademarked) 
goods presupposes that no matter if X amount of goods are consumed by Y, there 
would still be a good amount for Z and so on, to consume.142 This linkage of public 
goods theory to trademark is an important one since it captured the transmission of 
trademarks in an information context, and similar to copyrights or patents, that 
information has become available for all to use without diminishing the opportunities 
to others to use. Arguably, the public goods theory of trademarks reveals that, as 
economic entities, trademark law recognizes and supports the broader wealth 
generating capacity of trademarks.  
Barnes’s underlying argument is that a trademark is a mixed form of public good 
because the information that a trademark conveys falls into public domain due to its 
informative role.143 In other words, trademarks convey information that becomes 
public “once placed on the market,” if I may use a term largely applicable to 
exhaustion theory in trademark law. The public goods theory of trademarks, and as 
posited by Barnes, fits into the information function of trademarks, (communicative) 
and similar to the search cost function of trademarks, the information function serves 
the welfare of the consumers. As Barnes posited, the “source or product information 
may be associated with a mark through advertising. Advertising tacks additional 
information onto marks. This information is luggage that the mark carries on its travels 
through the stream of commerce.”144 The information function of a trademark is 
 
harmed by actual source confusion.” Id. at 46. For full discussion on market failure and 
trademarks see id. at 57–64. 
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142 Id. (“As long as there are non-rivalrous users, as there are for trademarks viewed as mixed 
public goods, the static/dynamic dilemma associated with non-rivalry remains.… Public goods 
theory suggests that the provision of search information to referential users through trademarks 
may be inefficient due to potential conflict between static and dynamic efficiency and 
inadequate demand revelation.”). 
143 Id. at 24. 
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appealing because the information function of a trademark, as opposed to search cost 
reduction, helps to maintain a surplus market which trademark owners in turn use to 
create a market power advantage for goods on the market.  
But what is truly appealing about the information function of a trademark is the 
extent that it helps to cement the investment function of trademarks and thereby 
creating further opportunities for wealth generating and brushing the consumer search 
cost function to near irrelevance. As pointed out earlier, the function of a trademark 
from a search cost point of view, is consumer oriented in that trademarks are seen as 
realms of consumer efficiency and to make the consumer better off, so to speak. This 
is also one sided and does not capture the function of trademarks from that of the 
producer–the proprietor who sought protection for the mark in the first place. While 
other functions, such as the informative (communicative), tend to represent the 
economic interest of the rightsholder, I want to shift the focus to economic effect of 
the investment function of trademarks, which has been gaining a foothold in recent 
years, due to a ruling from the CJEU which propelled this new function of trademarks. 
Naturally, one implication of a new theory regarding trademark functions is that it 
highlights the resourcefulness of trademarks and at the same time sends shockwaves 
through trademark jurisprudence itself.  
It took a quarrel over, of all things, flowers (roses) between a high-end British 
department store and an American flower distribution giant with global operations for 
courts to reckon that there was another dimension to trademarks—an investment 
function.145 Not that things as glowing and beautiful as nature’s gift to man–flowers–
should have been the object that determined that trademarks have an investment 
function, but then again, it harks back to man as economic entity engaging in all sort 
of economic activities for his benefit, whether, as early man would do–stamp his cattle 
and or present homo economicus often do–branding his flowers with a special mark to 
signify the scent of utopia.  
It was in Interflora v. Marks & Spencer that the CJEU confirmed the existence of 
an investment function of a trademark—even if that investment function “overlap[s] 
with the advertising function.”146  Of course, in one respect, the court confirming the 
existence of an investment function in a trademark should hardly be surprising to 
trademark owners, but for the trademark legal scholarship and even the trademark 
litigation world, it was a surprising decision or even one of bewilderment.147 
Nevertheless, the investment function of a trademark serves particular needs of not 
only trademark law going back to basics–in that trademark law was initially for 
manufacturers before it was appropriated to that of consumer interest—but also that 
the investment function is a natural percolator to the wealth generating function of 
trademarks.  
Interestingly, what sparked the quarrel about flowers and led the court to confirm 
the existence of an investment function in trademarks was the new phenomenon of 
keyword advertising, where a competitor often selects the trademark of a competing 
 
145 Case C-323/09, Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, 2011 E.C.R. I-0862, ¶ 61. 
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147 I recalled a discussion with one British Judge who described the Judgment in similar terms 
because the CJEU was caught between something like a rock and hard place. That conversation 
took place during a talk at Bayreuth University and the judge who is also an accomplished IP 
scholar now sits in the High Court along with the earned title of “Sir”.  
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brand as a keyword to advertise his own product on online services such as 
Google.com. Incidentally, it was Google Inc., that developed this new method of 
advertising—AdWords—for the internet (and it is a trademark headache altogether), 
but nevertheless, when Marks and Spencer chose the keyword “Interflora” and various 
derivatives–it triggered a backlash from Interflora Inc., who sued for trademark 
infringement.148 In addition to the origin and advertising function of a trademark, the 
CJEU explained that a trademark encompasses “various commercial techniques” and 
if a competitor “substantially interferes with the proprietor’s use of its trade mark to 
acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their 
loyalty, the third party’s use must be regarded as adversely affecting the trade mark’s 
investment function.”149 The substantial interference requirement that is available to 
competitors are that of AdWords in this context, and such AdWords can determine 
how consumers behave when searching for methods of delivering flowers online. 
Under these circumstances, AdWords can trigger a consumer to behave differently, 
either for comparison or ultimately rejecting the original trademark owner’s services 
for a competitor. Although, I disagree with the argument that under similar 
circumstances—and AdWords do not “trigger” trademark confusion—AdWords do 
create or shape consumer behavior in trademark law.150 
The choice of words by the court reflected one thing, in particular, the phrase: 
“various commercial techniques,” as it was meant to underline the all-important 
economic impact of trademarks and that trademark owners ought to reap their 
economic rewards from the investment in their “property.”151 The Advocate General 
gave a similar reasoning in his Opinion and noted: “The property-based approach also 
protects the communication, advertising and investment functions of trade marks with 
a view of creating a brand with a positive image and independent economic value 
(brand equity or good will).”152 This point of view essentially captured the economic 
effect of the investment function because it is by simply engaging in various 
commercial techniques that the proprietor invests in his mark so that it can lure 
potential customers to his goods and services while at the same time creating goodwill 
in reputation and increasing his “brand equity.”153 To discern the wider economic 
effect of the investment functions of trademarks, one must agree that trademarks are 
a form of property and once this belief is taken into account, then it is much easier to 
 
148 Case C-323/09, Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, 2011 E.C.R. I-0862, ¶ 18. 
149 Id. at ¶ 61–62. 
150 Stefan Bechtold & Catherine E. Tucker, Trademarks, Triggers, and Online Search, 11 J. 
EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 718 (2014). 
151 Interflora, 2011 E.C.R. I-0862, ¶ 61. 
152 Opinion Advocate General at ¶ 50, Interflora, 2011 E.C.R. I-0862. 
153 I have adopted the definition of brand equity from David Aaker & Alexander Biel, which 
states: “A consumer perceives a brand’s equity as the value added to the functional product or 
service by associating it with the brand name. A company may view it as the future discounted 
value of the profit stream that can be attributed to the price premium or enhanced loyalty 
generated by the brand name. From a managerial perspective, it is a set of assets – including 
brand awareness, brand loyalty, perceived quality, and brand associations – that are attached to 
a brand name or symbol.” David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel, Brand Equity and Advertising: 
An Overview, in BRAND EQUITY & ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG 
BRANDS 2 (David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993). 
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concur with the Interflora Court that trademarks serve an investment function. One 
problem with that argument is that the CJEU does not necessarily share this view. If 
it does, it is quite silent on the matter, which does not necessarily demonstrate that 
trademarks are a form of property.154 
The view that the CJEU subscribes to, as opposed to treating trademarks similarly 
to property rights, is that of economic function and this spans the various rulings of 
the Court over the decades that touched upon issues such as “economic link;” 
“economic progress;”155 or various rhetoric infused with the word “economic.” All 
these references and rhetoric by the CJEU on trademarks role and functions can be 
housed under one roof as the economic function theory of (European) trademark. But 
the greater implication for treating trademarks similarly to real property, despite some 
hesitation by the courts in recent years, is that as a form of intellectual property 
trademarks are perhaps “superior rights,”156 because I believe trademarks engage the 
transactional world of goods and services more regularly as opposed to other property 
and the rights in them.  
Frank Schechter’s work, which has had a lasting impact on contemporary 
trademark and theory, had used the term “commercial magnetism” to describe the 
power and attraction of trademarks. For Schechter, who was a lead trademark counsel 
for a prominent firm at the time, viewed trademarks as the source of profits for a firm 
when his arguments on the rational basis for trademark protection are decoded using 
the wealth generating theory.157 Similar to Schechter’s appeal of trademark’s 
commercial magnetism, the wealth generating theory of trademarks reflects a firm’s 
desire for profitability and control over the market the trademarked goods represent, 
as evidenced by the commercial techniques trademarks employ. Viewing the functions 
of trademarks as wealth generating as opposed to other functions is an attempt to 
challenge the very foundation of the current system of trademarks so that internal 
contraction can be made within the system to fully recognize the impact wealth 
generating in trademarks has on society.  
To summarize the wealth generating function of trademarks, as I posited above, is 
that the trademark owner has always been a “rational maximiser of self-interest”158 
and his trademarks ultimately represent those self-interests, and in one sense, the 
wealth generating theory of trademarks is vindicated by the wealth maximization 
 
154 However, in the United States, courts have often recognized that trademarks are a form of 
property. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (observing that 
“protected property interest is the right to exclude others … [including] trademarks ….”); K 
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 186 (1988) (holding that trademark law grants private 
property rights); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (noting that 
trademarks “and the right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among property 
rights.”); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). 
155 Case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711, [1990] 3 
C.M.L.R 571, where the AG quipped, “trade marks reward the manufacturer who consistently 
produces high-quality goods and they thus stimulate economic progress.” 
156 Robert Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 1477, 
1486 (2005) (discussing patent licensing cases). 
157 Schechter, supra note 17, at 831. 
158 Norman Frolich et al., Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism and Difference 
Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984). 
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theory in general economics. 
Bearing in mind the various contributions over the years on the functions and or 
economic aspects of trademarks, and having discussed some of those contributions in 
the preceding pages, I have come to realize that despite those unique arguments, the 
real purpose and function of a trademark did not entirely reveal itself either in those 
contributions and or those contributions did not properly frame the real function of a 
trademark. Because a trademark is an investment by its proprietor, its chief function 
is to generate wealth on behalf of that proprietor while serving as an economic link on 
the competitive free market between buyers and sellers of goods and services. The 
main reason why a firm or person engages in the production of goods and services is 
to generate a profit and hence create more wealth for shareholders in the firm and or 
for the individual economic entity (homo economicus). As the firm or individual 
economic entity engages in the production of goods and services, as principal gateway 
and connection to potential customers, a sign is chosen to represent those goods and 
services. While that sign performs other percolator functions such as identifying the 
origin of the goods and services and or reducing the amount of time a consumer uses 
to search for specific goods or services, the sign that is chosen as a conduit of economic 
activity linking the consumers and the firm or individual economic entity is merely to 
ensure that enough wealth is generated through sales that maximizes the potential of 
owners of the new sign representing the goods and services. Another way of viewing 
this same argument is to draw an analogy with the CJEU’s L’Oreal v. Bellure decision 
in that trademarks serve the proprietors’ best interest by allowing “financial 
compensation.”159  
One way of legitimizing the notion that a trademark’s main function is of wealth 
generation is to look to the theories of brand and asset valuation in finance/accounting 
and marketing. The finance/accounting theory of asset valuation posits that assets, and 
in our case, an intellectual property asset such as a trademark (brand) that these core 
assets allow for economic returns, while marketing theories of brand valuation posits 
similar arguments.160 Now let’s, for the sake of argument based on the 
finance/accounting and marketing theories of valuation, refer to intellectual property 
rights and specifically trademarks as “intangible assets.” From a trademark 
perspective, brand valuation entails the amount of money willing to be paid for the 
goodwill accumulated on the marketplace.161 The proprietor on his part is mostly 
concerned with the economic return that his trademark represents. It is always and will 
always be about overall returns because the actual business of trademarks is to 
generate business. 
There are a number of factors for how a trademark functions as a wealth generating 
device and these can range from the accumulation of goodwill; brand extensions; 
product differentiations; and creative deception among other factors. I have touched 
upon creative deception above and I will expound on product differentiation next and 
 
159 Case C-487/07, L'Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185. 
160 RUSSELL L. PARR, INVESTING IN INTANGIBLE ASSETS: FINDING AND PROFITING FROM 
HIDDEN CORPORATE VALUE 86–98 (1991) (discussing trademarks as intangible assets and their 
leveraging capabilities and as competitive barriers to entry). See also PETER J. GROVES, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THEIR VALUATION: A HANDBOOK FOR BANKERS, 
COMPANIES, AND THEIR ADVISERS 128–29 (1st ed. 1997). 
161 Celia Lury, Trade Mark Style as a Way of Fixing Things, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 217 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008). 
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will also allude to its role in antitrust harm.    
C. Product Differentiation as Trademarking Activities  
One of the most proliferous weapons available to trademark holders is that of 
product differentiation where they are able to use this form of trademarking activity 
to cement their market power status and by extent, create harms for consumers. One 
of the claims in this Article is that product differentiation using trademarks creates 
more than average market power and this market power borders on the threshold of 
antitrust analysis and by extent a concern to antitrust law.162 In antitrust cases, U.S. 
courts have recognized product differentiation as a method of measuring market 
power. For example, in GT Sylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “product 
differentiation” is one method used to measure market power.163 This is not difficult 
to translate to the trademark settings where the proliferation of brands as a method of 
product differentiation has been a tool of creative deception to the detriment to 
consumers. 
So then, what really is product differentiation,164 and how does it relate to 
trademarks? Is there a connection between production differentiation and antitrust? If 
so, what is the effect of this relationship from a trademark perspective? These are some 
questions addressed in this section. In addition, these questions are crucial to the main 
inquiry of this Article, that is, whether trademarks are a source of market power and 
as such an antitrust problem. Product differentiation is a method used to differentiate 
and distinguish “similar products from each other by persuasive (non-informational) 
advertising and other forms of sales promotion.”165 This definition of product 
differentiation is similar to one given by Judge Richard Posner, who explained that 
“product differentiation is the phenomenon of purchasers’ distinguishing among 
different sellers or brands of the same product.”166  
Product differentiation is a tool employed using mostly trademarking activities, 
such as branding or labeling, to give an impression on consumers that goods that are 
 
162 See also Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1. 
163 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 64 (1977) (White, J., concurring). 
164 Richard E. Caves & Peter J. Williamson, What is Product Differentiation, Really?, 34 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 113, 113 (1985); James M. Treece, Protectability of Product Differentiation: Is 
and Ought Compared, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1964) (“The term product 
differentiation is inclusive. It includes, as has been suggested, designs and configurations of 
goods and their dress, as well as packaging. It also embraces symbols of origin such as 
trademarks and tradenames. It goes beyond the product itself and in fact extends to the seller’s 
location, to his reputation, manner and tone, and to each of the conditions which surround a 
sale.” (citations omitted)). 
 
165 Samuel A. Smith, Antitrust and the Monopoly Problem: Toward a More Relevant Legal 
Analysis, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 19, 38–39 (1969) (identifying brand name price 
difference, concentration, vertical restraints such as rpm, exclusive dealing and territorial 
restrictions, as forms of product differentiation). 
 
166 Richard Posner, Working Paper III: Advertising and Product Differentiation, 2 ANTITRUST 
L. & ECON. REV. 19, 45 (1969) (“Product differentiation … manifests itself in consumer loyalty, 
is associated with product differences, trademarks, differential reputations of sellers for 
reliability, promptness, answerability, etc. – and with advertising.”). 
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physically similar are different. According to one definition: 
Product differentiation can be interpreted in a strict sense to mean that, 
economically . . ., even physically similar goods are not the same to the 
consumer if there exist quite small variations of a qualitative nature. Such 
differences need not include the exact physical make-up of the good itself; 
although such factors as technical merit, finish and quality of material are, of 
course, important. The differences need only exist in the circumstances 
surround the sale of the good. Thus trade-names, labels, packing and retail 
services are some of the factors which must, for most cases, be considered to 
be a minimum part of the consumer’s assessment of a good.167 
In U.S. v. Oracle Corp.,168 the court adopted a definition of product differentiation 
that economists often use: 
Firms in perfect competition produce homogenous product so that price is 
the only variable of interest to consumers, and no firm can raise its price 
above marginal cost without losing its entire market share . . . . Differentiated 
products are imperfect substitutes representing as they do different features 
or characteristics that appeal variously to different customers. Because no 
product is a perfect substitute of another in a differentiated products market, 
each seller continues to face a downward sloping demand curve. Like a pure 
monopolist, the seller of a differentiated product, facing a downward sloping, 
or less than perfectly elastic curve, maximizes its profits by pricing above 
marginal cost.169  
The analysis of differentiated products in U.S. v. Oracle was not the first time 
courts have addressed the issue,170 and therefore, the approach to product 
differentiation, using trademarks as a point of focus in this Article, under antitrust law, 
sustains such an approach and how that approach affects intellectual property rights. 
The definitions of product differentiation outlined above are from an economic 
perspective.171 They are equally important and applicable to a legal definition of 
product differentiation and also incorporate how other approaches to product 
differentiation such as in marketing are used. The importance of these definitions of 
product differentiation to trademarks is that it buttresses the argument that trademarks 
are an independent economic entity and that product differentiation as a form of 
trademarking activity “indicates the existence of some degree of market power since 
 
167 Alex Hunter, Product Differentiation and Welfare Economics, 60 Q.J. ECON. 533, 533–34 
(1955). 
 
168 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 
169 Id. at 1115 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
170 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (describing the 
concepts of monopolistic competition and differentiated product markets). 
 
171 Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 407, 407 (1976) 
(“Product differentiation involves a set of real economic choices because there are increasing 
returns or declining average costs in the development, production, marketing and distribution 
activities of firms.”). 
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it gives the producer the ability to price above cost.”172 The implication of this, as one 
author observed is that “every differentiated product” then has the ability “to be its 
own antitrust product market” and this then raises questions of product market 
definition in antitrust law. Looked at another way, a producer selling dietary 
supplements under the brand/trademark GRENADE will diversify into various 
supplements fulfilling other dietary functions but still carry the GRENADE trademark, 
such as GRENADE BLAST, for the sake of argument. This creates either a distinct 
market limited to that product, as Keyte posited, or its own antitrust product market.173 
By using trademarking activities to differentiate products then producers are able to 
further monopolize the product market they are in, building on the exclusivity 
endowed in the trademark.  
One challenge of product differentiation is developing a legal definition or 
principles for what it entails. And this can turn out to be tricky, because, like most 
legal problems, they are handled on a case by case basis. From the Hunter definition 
of product differentiation above, we could deduce that product differentiation can 
occur in different ways, and Keyte also argued that product differentiation can occur 
in forms, such as single brand differentiation; branded and generic goods, products 
differentiation by price, quality and consumer utility.174 Courts in the U.S. have 
identified product differentiation based on some of these criteria. For example in FTC 
v. Whole Foods, the court explained that price information was instrumental in 
determining product differentiation: “the key to distinguishing product differentiation 
from separate product markets lies in price information.”175 In terms of “separate 
product markets,” interestingly the court noted that “product differentiation does not 
mean different product markets.”176 This is crucial because where two food giants 
merged and then also sell various products using trademarking activities such as 
branding, private labels and product differentiation, in terms of antitrust law what is 
important for consumers are “products that are distinguishable in [their] minds” as 
oppose to “separate markets.”177  
The gravity of this observation by the court holds one of the key factors into the 
possible harms of product differentiation when trademarking activities are involved 
and that is pricing, because consumers may ignore product markets but they do mind 
how much they spend on a product for which trademarking activities convey 
information. This does not mean that product differentiation is all together bad in the 
eyes of antitrust law as some courts in the U.S. were keen on pointing this out. In 
 
 
172 NEIL J. WILKOF & DANIEL BURKITT, TRADE MARK LICENSING ¶ 2:39 (2d ed. 2005) 
(explaining that trademarks are also a good in itself noting “the trade mark no longer serves to 
sell the goods, but it serves to sell itself.”); James A. Keyte, Market Definition and 
Differentiated Products: The Need for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 697, 698 
(1995).  
173 Keyte, supra note 172, at 698. 
174 Id. at 705. 
 
175 548 F. 3d 1028, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 
176 Id. at 1055. 
 
177 Id. 
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Borden v. FTC, for instance, the Court explained that “a highly successful brand name 
and product differentiation achieved through extensive advertising over the years . . . 
does not create a presumption of monopoly power.”178  
These various positions on product differentiation, as demonstrated by some 
courts, only suggest that product differentiation is nonetheless an issue that divides 
not only courts but also a complicated issue from even a trademark law perspective. 
In one case where it was alleged that trademarks were being used to monopolize the 
product markets for fraternity insignia and class rings, the Seventh Circuit explained 
that if “a degree of substantial product differentiation”179 prices for the goods in 
questions would have been affected and also noted that trademarks were being used 
as a tool to “discourage[] competitors from entering the [market for fraternity 
insignia’s and high school class rings].”180 In the case of Borden v. FTC, I disagree 
where the court suggested that production differentiation may not altogether be a bad 
thing because the reasoning did not take into consideration the negative effects of 
product differentiation, and in particular, product differentiation ability to facilitate the 
creation of barriers to entry.181  
One of the claims I advance is that product differentiation182 is a source of 
monopoly power. When I first made that argument,183 I did not elaborate on my thesis 
and I have the opportunity to respond in part in this section.184 Product differentiation 
 
178 674 F.2d 498, 511–512 (6th Cir.1982). See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Regroup, Inc. 809 F.2d 
971, 978–89 (2d Cir. 1987) (“By focusing upon hindrances to legitimate competition, the 
functionality test, carefully applied, can accommodate consumer’s somewhat conflicting 
interests in being assured enough product differentiation to avoid confusion as to source and in 
being afforded the benefits of competition among producers.”); Sandra Co. v. FTC, 339 F. 2d 
847, 857 (6th Cir. 1964) (“[S]ignificant product differentiation increases somewhat the 
importance of intrabrand competition between distributors . . . product differentiation increases 
the importance of successful advertising and promotion to inform the ultimate consumer of the 
advantages of one differentiated product over another.”); Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival 
Enters., 248 Cal. Rptr. 189, 199–200 (1988); see also supra note 7 (discussing extensively 
product differentiation). 
179 L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 10 (7th Cir. 1971). 
180 Id. at 17. 
181 Redwood Theatres, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 201. 
182 Product differentiation refers to the variations within a product class that consumers view 
as imperfect substitute. See Simon Anderson, Product Differentiation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); see 
also Michael Lovell, Product Differentiation and Market Structure, 8 W. ECON. J. 120 (1970) 
(“Product differentiation offers the consumer the opportunity to select commodities closely 
tailored to his individual preferences…”). See also PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 572 (13th ed. 1989) (“[A] barrier to competition arises when legal 
restrictions or product differentiation reduces the number of competitors below the number that 
would survive on the basis of efficient cost structure alone.”); Charles Mueller, Sources of 
Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called ‘Product Differentiation’, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 70 
(1968) (“Product differentiation refers to the distinguishing or setting apart of substitute 
products from each other in the minds of buyers.”).  
183 Economics of Distinctiveness, supra note 1. 
184 But see Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1 for more elaborate 
discussions.  
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is a phenomenon that leads to artificial market division and therefore “differentiation 
. . . leads to greater concentration and more imperfect competition.”185 Or, as Edward 
Chamberlin, puts it: “with differentiation appears monopoly, and as it proceeds further 
the element of monopoly becomes greater.”186 In addition, product differentiation is a 
source of market power in that new firms find it harder to enter because the monopolist 
(or established firm) “produce products which by reason of past performance, brand 
names, or advertising have a strong hold on the affections of the buying public.”187 
The brand names, which I use here as trademarks, since some consumers may have an 
affection for these brands, and because of their loyalty, switching is either impossible, 
or the brands have grown into status symbols.  
Product differentiation is inextricably linked to trademarks,188 in that 
manufacturers use product differentiation as a commercial technique, but have similar 
traits to trademarks as source identifiers. In Miller Brewing v. Falstaff, the court 
explained that differentiating “devices” were not “technically trademarks”.189 As a 
technique, product differentiation is able to separate itself from trademark rights, but 
yet, invoke trademark rights for product protection. The relationship between product 
differentiation, from a trademark perspective, and that of antitrust law, is that product 
differentiation sets in motion a path for a manufacture to gain dominance on a relevant 
market.190 The effect is that any dominance gained as a result of product differentiation 
can (probably/will) lead to a price increase.191 There is also an argument to be made 
 
185 Samuelson & Nordhaus, supra note 182, at 573. EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 9 (2d ed. 1936) (“With differentiation appears monopoly, and as 
it proceeds further the element of monopoly becomes greater. Where there is any degree of 
differentiation whatever, each seller has an absolute monopoly of his own product, but is subject 
to the competition of more or less imperfect substitutes.”). 
186 EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 9 (2d ed. 1936). 
187 K. E. Boulding, Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries, 2 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 116, 117 (1957) (emphasis added). 
188 Posner, supra note 166. 
189 503 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D.R.I. 1980). 
190 Barnes, supra note 94; Joseph Livermore, On Uses of a Competitor’s Trademark, 20 STAN. 
L. REV. 448, 449–450 (1968) (“The economic effects of… product differentiation made possible 
by trademarks [allows] the trademark proprietor… to achieve a degree of insulation from 
normal competitive pressures.”). See also Smith, supra note 154, at 38 (“The monopoly power 
involved [in product differentiation] in a particular industry is measured in terms of price 
differential between the advertised and the unadvertised brands of comparable quality.”). 
191 Barnes, supra note 94, at 27 (“Firms also compete by investing in ways to make their 
products different from (or appear different from) competing products. By associating unique 
characteristics with their marks, suppliers reap the benefits of developing and marketing if their 
exclusive right to the mark is protected. Product differentiation has been described as the 
foundation of rationally functioning consumer product markets because it permits suppliers to 
satisfy consumers’ diverse preferences. Product differentiation can, however, lead to 
dominance of product markets, higher prices, and foreclosure of would-be-competitors. 
Trademark law’s conflicted relationship with product differentiation arises from the fact that 
the information content of a mark may both highlight the differences between products that 
satisfy different consumers and obscure similarities that might increase competition and lower 
prices.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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that product differentiation has benefits for consumers, and can be viewed the same 
way trademarks functions as a source identifier or to reduce search costs, product 
differentiation can function the same way. This is a plausible argument. However, 
when analyzing from a different perspective, product differentiation serves as a source 
of market power, then harms to a consumer that product differentiation may cause are 
outweighed by any benefits that product differentiation may mitigate. Product 
differentiation, as a creature of fair competition, is in itself, a creature that may create 
anticompetitive barriers to entry.192 The antitrust analysis of product differentiation, 
thus, also turns to an antitrust analysis of trademarks and any anticompetitive harm as 
a result of trademarks and product differentiation.193  
There are two observable features of product differentiation that the preceding 
discussion revealed. The first is that product differentiation is a tool that can promote 
a healthy degree of competition,194 and the second is that product differentiation is, 
ironically, also a tool to determine the extent of market power that trademarking 
activities create and thereby monopolize the product market for goods and services.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Discussions on the intersection of trademarks and antitrust often require novel 
arguments in order to align possible breaches of antitrust rules. The arguments in this 
Article are only some insights into which trademarks are possibly an antitrust problem. 
The notion of creative deception that I developed in the Article helped to situate how 
some of the broader market dynamics used by firms may potentially provide some of 
the answers. The arguments were in part theoretical and in part practical when the case 
studies are factored in the discussions. Given that I also advanced a new theory of 
wealth generating function for trademarks and showed that the investment function of 
trademarks served as a conduit for the wealth generating capacity of trademarks, I 
suspect not all will be convinced. However, the implications are that there is a potential 
new ground to consider when courts are examining antitrust cases that involved 
trademarks and alleged monopolistic behavior. Moreover, since I also argued that the 
traditional search cost function of trademarks has been unfairly elevated without 
giving due consideration to the original function of trademarks— business and wealth 
creation—then, there are grounds to further investigate the implication of wealth 
creation by firms using trademarks on the competitive market. Another argument I 
developed was that trademarks pursue a dual function to promote competition and, at 
the same time, serve as a source of market power. These opposites also serve to 
confirm the near impossibility of correctly positioning trademarks in the antitrust 
framework. I hope these arguments can only further drive the debate.  
 
 
 
192 JULES STUYCK, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: THE LEGAL SITUATION 107 (1983) (“Product 
differentiation, the creation of objective or subjective differences between products within the 
range of one or several concerns, has given rise to anxiety as to the consequences it may have 
for the freedom of competitors to compete (barriers to entry), the structure of the market 
(concentrations) and the transparency of the market.”). 
193 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1. 
194 Similar observation was made in United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 
543, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (“[C]ompetition is based only partially on price because of product 
differentiation, there has remained a relatively healthy degree of product competition”).  
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